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ABSTRACT 
Recent advances in the maritime industry include the research and development of new 
sophisticated ships including the autonomous ships. The new autonomy concept though comes at 
the cost of additional complexity introduced by the number of systems that need to be installed on-
board and on-shore, the software intensiveness of the complete system, the involved interactions 
between the systems, components and humans and the increased connectivity. All the above results 
in the increased system vulnerability to cyber-attacks, which may lead to unavailability or hazardous 
behaviour of the critical ship systems. The aim of this study is the identification of the safety related 
cyber-attacks to the navigation and propulsion systems of an inland autonomous ship as well as the 
safety enhancement of the ship systems design. For this purpose, the Cyber Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis method is employed supported by the literature review of the system vulnerabilities and 
potential cyber-attacks. The Formal Safety Assessment risk matrix is employed for ranking of the 
hazardous scenarios. The results demonstrate that a number of critical scenarios can arise on the 
investigated autonomous vessel due to the known vulnerabilities. These can be sufficiently 
controlled by introducing appropriate modifications of the system design. 
 
Keywords: Safety; Cybersecurity; Autonomous inland vessel; Navigation and propulsion systems; 
Cyber Preliminary Hazard Analysis. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) represent a class of systems consisting of control elements 
as well as software and hardware, which are used to effectively control physical processes 
advancing in a number of application areas including the maritime industry (DNV GL, 2015). CPSs 
are expected to increase the productivity and safety levels by removing, substituting and/or 
supporting the operator in the decision-making process, thus reducing the number of human errors 
leading to accidents. Typical examples of the marine CPSs include the Diesel-Electric Propulsion 
plant, the Safety Monitoring and Control System, the Dynamic Positioning System as well as the 
Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning systems (DNV GL, 2015). The number of the CPSs is expected 
to increase in autonomous ships, which are considered to be the ultimate maritime CPS. 
 
The introduction of the CPSs is accompanied with increased complexity owed to the 
heterogeneous character of the CPSs, the dependence on information exchanging with other 
systems, the additional new interactions with humans, the increased number of controllers running 
complicated software and the increased interconnectivity required for implementing the desired 
CPSs’ functionalities (Bolbot, Theotokatos, Bujorianu, Boulougouris, & Vassalos, 2019). However, 
this also introduces new hazards as cyber-attacks can exploit vulnerabilities in the communication 
links and directly affect the integrity or availability of the data and control systems leading the CPSs 
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to accidents (Bolbot et al., 2019; Eloranta & Whitehead, 2016). Considering that ships and their 
cargo are assets with great value, this inevitably will lead to severe financial consequences in case 
of an autonomous vessel; it may also have serious safety implications. 
 
There is an increasing number of concerns with respect to the ship systems vulnerability to 
cyber-attacks in the maritime industry and a number of guidelines have been developed to address 
these concerns (Boyes & Isbell, 2017; DNV GL, 2016, 2019; IMO, 2016; Maritime affairs directorate 
of France, 2016; United States Coast Guard, 2015). In addition, a number of previous research 
studies focused on the cyber security assessment of the ship control systems and ship networks in 
autonomous ships. Jones, Tam, and Papadaki (2016) reported the identification of different attack 
scenarios on a cargo ship. Tam and Jones (2019) proposed a model-based approach for the risk 
assessment of cyber-threats named MaCRA (Maritime Cyber-Risk Assessment) by considering the 
technological systems vulnerabilities as well as the ease-of-exploit and the potential hackers 
rewards. Using the same model-based approach, Tam and Jones (2018) implemented a risk 
assessment for a number of autonomous vessels. Kavallieratos, Katsikas, and Gkioulos (2019) 
employed the STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service 
and Elevation of Privilege) method to assess risks in an autonomous vessel. Omitola, Downes, Wills, 
Zwolinski, and Butler (2018) analysed an unmanned surface vessel navigation system using the 
System-Theoretic Process Analysis for cyber-attacks (STPA-sec) targeting at modifying data that 
are provided as input to the vessel navigation system. 
 
However, in the previous research studies the risk assessment was implemented considering 
high level system architecture. Furthermore, the risk assessment in the previous studies identified a 
number of potential attack scenarios, but did not focus on the safety related consequences. In 
addition, none of the previous studies conducted a risk assessment of an inland autonomous vessel. 
Inland autonomous vessel is operating in different environment from the short sea or ocean going 
vessels, has different system requirements and size and can attract the interest from different 
hackers groups than the short sea and ocean going vessels.  
 
Therefore, the hazardous scenarios that can arise due to cyber-attacks can be very different 
in autonomous inland ship. In this respect, the aim of this study is to implement a risk assessment 
for the navigation and propulsion systems of an inland autonomous vessel. To the best of authors 
knowledge, this is the first study applying the Cyber Preliminary Hazard Analysis (CPHA) method to 
an autonomous vessel. The novel contributions of the study include (a) the adjustment of CPHA for 
application to ship systems, (b) the identification of potential hazardous scenarios arising due to 
cyber-attacks in propulsion and navigation system of an inland autonomous ship and (c) the 
highlighting of the critical safety/cyber security control measures for this ship. 
 
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. The followed method for cyber-attacks 
risk assessment is presented in Section 2. A description of an inland autonomous vessel navigation 
and propulsion systems is provided in section 3. In section 4, the results of the method application 
are provided and discussed. In the conclusions section, the main findings are summarised and 
suggestions for the future research are provided. 
2 METHODOLOGY 
During the selection of suitable methods, the following requirements have been considered: 
 The method must be aligned with the relevant cyber security standards - IEC 62443, 
ISO 27000 and IEC 61580, and need to be applicable either during the high-level or 
the detailed level risk analysis (Flaus, 2019). 
 The method must focus on the cyber security induced safety risks (Flaus, 2019). 
 The method must incorporate different potential attackers groups (Tam & Jones, 2019). 
 The method must be marinised – addressing the needs of maritime industry and 
aligned with the maritime regulations for safety approval (International Maritime 
Organisation, 2013). 
 The method must be preferentially model-based (Bolbot et al., 2019). 
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Based on the above considerations the Cyber Preliminary Hazard Analysis (CPHA) (Flaus, 
2019) has been selected. The advantages of this method are the following: 
 The method can be applied during the initial design stages and does not require many 
details for the investigated system characteristics (Bolbot et al., 2019) similarly with the 
STRIDE and MaCRA methods. 
 The method is not as labour intensive as STPA (Abdulkhaleq & Wagner, 2015), 
although it can be less formal approach and less detailed when it comes to hazards 
identification. Therefore, the CPHA is easier to be applied during high-level risk 
assessment. The STPA does not have any specific guidance related to identification 
of cyber attacks, simply suggests that some hazardous scenarios can arise due to 
cyber security violation (Young & Leveson, 2014). The CPHA also allows ranking of 
different scenarios which is not integral part of the STPA. 
 The method incorporates the available or new safety and security barriers, guiding in 
this way the system design improvement. This information is not present in the STRIDE 
and MaCRA methods. 
 Compared to the STRIDE and MaCRA methods,  the CPHA: (a) is not limited to the 
specific suggested attack types, and; (b) describes better the relevant hazardous 
scenarios by incorporating the potential attack type and the relevant hazardous 
consequences. 
 CPHA is based on Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), which is a well-known method 
for safety assessment and is proposed by ISO 31000 and IEC 61580. 
Figure 1 CPHA methodology flowchart. 
 
The CPHA followed steps are provided in the flowchart depicted in Figure 1, whilst the method 
steps are elaborated further below. These are the CPHA steps described in (Flaus, 2019) with small 
modifications. Another difference is that the scenarios ranking is implemented using Formal Safety 
Assessment risk matrix (International Maritime Organisation, 2013). 
 
The prerequisite for the CPHA is the identification of: (a) the control system elements, (b) the 
control system elements interfaces with the physical word, the controlled processes and other control 
system elements interfaces, (c) the potential entry points into system. This is implemented in step 1 
(Figure 1), by analysing the available system information as well as by developing the system 
physical and logical mapping (Flaus, 2019). 
 
As the attackers do not have neither the same motives nor the same resources when attacking 
a ship network (Tam & Jones, 2019), for identifying and ranking the attack scenarios in step 5 (Figure 
1), the following parameters need to be considered: (a) which entry points can be exploited, and; (b) 
which system will be targeted and (c) in which way by each attacker group. In this respect, the 
potential attack groups are identified in step 2 (Figure 1) by referring to the relevant literature. 
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The known vulnerabilities and the potential entry points are identified in step 3 (Figure 1) by 
using the information provided in the following resources: (a) previous research publications e.g. 
(Flaus, 2019; Kavallieratos et al., 2019; Omitola et al., 2018; Tam & Jones, 2018); (b) the available 
maritime standards (Boyes & Isbell, 2017; DNV GL, 2016; IMO, 2016; Maritime affairs directorate of 
France, 2016); (c) relevant generic standards (IEC, 2011a), and; (d) the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) database (CISA, 2019a). 
 
The potential vulnerabilities in the system are used to develop the potential attack scenarios 
in step 4 (Figure 1) (Flaus, 2019). The information about the system interactions and system 
components functionalities is used to derive the potential consequences in step 5 (Figure 1). In step 
6, the scenarios are ranked according to the expected frequency occurrence and the severity of 
consequences. The frequency and the severity of each attack scenario are ranked using the Formal 
Safety Assessment (FSA) suggested ranking tables (International Maritime Organisation, 2013), 
presented in Table 1 and Table 2, whilst the risk is evaluated using the risk matrix presented in Table 
3 to harmonise the analysis results with the relevant IMO Formal Safety Assessment guidelines. The 
frequency ranking for each attack scenario is implemented by considering (a) the level of exposure 
of each system to attack due to connectivity, (b) the interest of specific attack group in an attack 
scenario, (c) the attacker level and (d) the access control to the systems. The severity ranking is 
implemented based on consequences. The preventive and mitigating barriers are identified and 
proposed in step 7. Then, the scenarios risk is reassessed considering the available or the 
preventive and mitigating barriers. Based on this analysis results, the relevant safety 
recommendations at the initial ship design stage are derived. These results can be used as input to 
more detailed analysis as required by IEC 62443 (BSI, 2009). 
 
Table 1 Ranking for successful attack scenarios (International Maritime Organisation, 2013). 
Ranking 
(FI) 
Frequency Definition F  
(per ship year) 
F  
(per ship hour) 
7 Frequent Likely to occur once per month on 
one ship 
10 1.14 10-3 
5 Reasonably 
probable 
Likely to occur once per year in a fleet 
of 10 ships, i.e. likely to occur a few 
times during the ship's life 
10-1 1.14 10-5 
3 Remote Likely to occur once per year in a fleet 
of 1,000 ships, i.e. likely to occur in 
the total life of several similar ships 
10-3 1.14 10-7 
1 Extremely 
remote 
Likely to occur once in the lifetime (20 
years) of a world fleet of 5,000 ships. 
10-5 1.14 10-9 
Table 2 Ranking for severity of consequences (International Maritime Organisation, 2013). 
Ranking 
(SI) 
Severity Effects on human  
safety 
Effects on 
ship 
Oil spillage definition S 
Equivalent 
fatalities 
4 Catastrophic Multiple fatalities Total loss Oil spill size between 
< 100 - 1000 tonnes 
10 
3 Severe Single fatality or 
multiple severe 
injuries 
Severe 
damage 
Oil spill size between 
< 10 - 100 tonnes 
10-0 
2 Significant Multiple or sever 
injuries 
Non-severe 
ship damage 
Oil spill size between 
< 1 - 10 tonnes 
10-1 
1 Minor Single or minor 
injuries 
Local 
equipment 
damage 
Oil spill size < 1 
tonne 
10-2 
 
 
 
5 
 
Table 3 The risk matrix (International Maritime Organisation, 2013) 
Risk Index (RI) 
FI Frequency 
Severity (SI) 
1 2 3 4 
Minor Significant Severe Catastrophic 
7 Frequent (H) 8 (H) 9 (H) 10 (H) 11 
6  (M) 7 (H) 8 (H) 9 (H) 10 
5 Reasonably probable (M) 6 (M) 7 (H) 8 (H) 9 
4  (M) 5 (M) 6 (M) 7 (H) 8 
3 Remote (L) 4 (M) 5 (M) 6 (M) 7 
2  (L) 3 (L) 4 (M) 5 (M) 6 
1 Extremely remote (L) 2 (L) 3 (L) 4 (M) 5 
High (H) =Intolerable Risk Medium (M) =Tolerable Risk Low (L) =Negligible Risk 
3 CASE STUDY DESCRIPTION 
The proposed methodology was applied to an autonomous version of a conventional 
operational Pallet Shuttle Barge (PSB) (Blue Lines Logistics, 2015) as the particular PSB is going to 
be retrofitted into an autonomous during AUTOSHIP project. The selected autonomous PSB is 
supposed to operate from/to the port of Antwerp in Belgium and the interconnected canals. The main 
ship particulars are provided in Table 4. The focus of the analysis was put on this vessel navigation 
and propulsion systems, as they are considered the most vulnerable to cyber-attacks (BIMCO, 
2018). The equipment that is used for the navigation and the propulsion, as well as the relevant 
interconnections and interactions between the involved subsystems are schematically shown in 
Figure 2. The network description was developed based on the information provided in (Boyes & 
Isbell, 2017; Höyhtyä, Huusko, Kiviranta, Solberg, & Rokka, 2017; Maritime affairs directorate of 
France, 2016; Schmidt, Fentzahn, Atlason, & Rødseth, 2015; Stefani, 2013) and available drawings 
for similar ships. The actual network interconnections and equipment may differentiate in the final 
design of this autonomous PSB. The PSB selected components functionalities description is 
provided in Table 5. For the present analysis, it was considered that the PSB is in fully autonomous 
operation, so there is no crew onboard the vessel. 
Table 4 PSB particulars. 
Type Catamaran 
Length 50 m 
Breadth 6.6 m 
Maximum Draught 2.2 m 
Air draught 5.6 m 
Maximum cargo load 300 tonnes 
Maximum speed 8.1 knots 
Engine output 300 hp 
Propulsion type Diesel-mechanical with azimuth 
propulsion aft and bow thruster at the bow 
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Table 5 PSB selected components functionalities description. 
Component Functions 
Shore control centre  Monitoring of physical processes 
 Navigation control 
 Control over the ship in emergency/manoeuvring operating 
modes 
 Implementation of software updates 
Connectivity manager  Control over information flow between the vessel and the 
shore control centre 
Autonomous ship controller  Monitoring of the processes safety and alarm generation 
 Control over ship operating modes (emergency, sailing, 
autonomous, remotely controlled etc.) 
Ship control station  Interface between crew on board and the vessel, allowing 
the crew to take control over the navigation systems and 
engine automation systems 
Engine automation system  Machinery components health monitoring 
System Control And Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) server 
 Machinery system sensors measurements and alarms 
data log 
Main engine controller  Control over engine speed 
 Engine health status monitoring 
Generator controller  Generator speed control 
 Generator health status monitoring 
Azimuth controller  Azimuth angle control 
 Azimuth health monitoring 
Bow thruster controller  Bow thruster speed control 
Network cabinet  Interconnection with other systems 
Route planning system  Selecting the route between departure and arrival point 
based on the traffic in area 
Navigation and collision 
avoidance system 
 Navigating within ports and channels 
 Position holding 
 Avoiding collision with other vessels and objects 
Situation awareness system  Picture compilations around the vessel 
Electronic Chart Display 
Information System (ECDIS) 
 Detecting position of the ship on the map 
Voyage Data Recorder (VDR)  Principal alarms and sensors measurements recording 
Very High Frequency (VHF) 
radio 
 Transmitting messages between vessels 
Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) 
 Sending and receiving GPS positions, speed, heading, 
type of ship, next port and estimated time of arrival to and 
from surrounding ships 
Global Maritime Distress and 
Safety System (GMDSS) 
 Sending and receiving critical safety alerts 
RAdio Detection And Ranging 
(RADAR) 
 Detection and determination of the position and speed of 
the objects 
Light Detection And Ranging 
(LiDAR)/ Laser Detection And 
Ranging (LADAR) 
 Detection and determination of the position and speed of 
the objects with greater accuracy 
Video cameras  Objects detection and recognition 
Echo sounder  Depth measurement 
Global Positioning System 
(GPS) 
 Position measurement, and indirectly speed measurement 
Gyro compass  Angular position and velocity measurement 
Speed log measurement  Speed measurement 
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4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The investigated autonomous ship systems control elements, their interactions with other 
control elements, the potential entry points and the relevant network zones are presented in Figure 
2 and Figure 3, which are the results of the used methodology first step. 
 
The potential attackers can be classified into the following groups (Results of step 2) (Boyes 
& Isbell, 2017; Flaus, 2019; IEC, 2011b; Tam & Jones, 2019): 
 
 Former malicious employees aiming at taking revenge from the ship operating company. 
 Malicious external providers desiring to steal the machinery data. 
 Activists opposed to autonomous ships introduction in the maritime industry (Hacktivists). 
 Hackers willing to prove and train their skills. 
 Competitors aiming at stealing valuable data or sabotaging and damaging the ship. 
 Criminals aiming at stealing the ship, its cargo, components or seeking for a monetary reward. 
 Terrorists aiming at damaging the ship and/or causing fatalities. 
 States in case of total war aiming at damaging or taking control over the ship. 
 
Since the terrorist group is the group of people targeting the most on the accident achievement, 
the focus of the present case study will shift towards identifying attacks and safety scenarios, which 
may be of interest by terrorists. For this analysis, it was assumed that there is an undisclosed group 
of terrorists which possesses significant technical knowledge about the vessel and its 
communication systems. This group attacks can be considered similar to the attacks implemented 
by states in case of a total war. The potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited and the attacks 
that can be realised are provided in the following paragraphs. 
 
Social engineering attacks are considered the most powerful tool on the hackers hands (Flaus, 
2019). Thus, a successful phishing scam can be used to get access of the ship through the shore 
control centre. Attacks installing malware using flash medium can be also implemented on the shore 
Figure 2 Schematic of PSB network and interactions 
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control centre and at ship control station, as described in (Lund, Hareide, & Jøsok, 2018) or through 
accidental communication bridges developed between the smart devices with wireless connectivity 
used by maintenance personnel and the ship control systems (Oates, Roberts, & Twomey, 2017). 
4G protocol has been found vulnerable to a number of attacks, where a malicious node can be used 
to impede the communication or to steal information (Hussain, Chowdhury, Mehnaz, & Bertino, 
2018). However the ship satellite communications systems have been also proved to be vulnerable 
to penetration (Munro, 2017). Configurations in the communication between the ship and the shore 
control centre including an anonymous File Transfer Protocol can lead to a cyber security breach 
(IEC, 2011b). Even Virtual Private Networks can have exploitable vulnerabilities, such as the use of 
outdated communication protocols (DNV GL, 2016; Flaus, 2019). Remote access can be also 
facilitated by using an available web link to the system equipment with inappropriate username and 
password (Munro, 2017; Oates et al., 2017) or due to inappropriate remote unit firewall configuration 
settings (CISA, 2019d; DNV GL, 2016; Oates et al., 2017). 
 
Physical attacks (Flaus, 2019) can be also considered in the case of PBS as the vessel is 
operating in a close proximity to the shore (or river/channel banks) and no crew is present. The 
Programming Logic Controllers (PLCs) can be vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) or malware 
attacks due to an unchecked integer overflow vulnerability (Flaus, 2019) or other vulnerabilities 
(CISA, 2019b; Oates et al., 2017). Considering that patching may not be as frequently implemented 
as required and that due to the extensive ship lifetime compared to other information technology 
systems it may not be technically feasible to patch the software (Oates et al., 2017). Therefore it is 
highly likely that known vulnerability is being exploited (Nazir, Patel, & Patel, 2017; Oates et al., 
2017). However system patching by system provider itself opens new opportunities for attacks as it 
requires remote connection to the vessel and can allow malware propagation from the software 
owner (Oates et al., 2017). System hardware can be already infected with malware installed before 
actual installation on the ship (logic bombs and backdoors) which cannot be captured by functional 
testing (Oates et al., 2017). An attacker can even freeze one sensor measurement in a PLC, 
misleading in this way the operator (Krotofil et al., 2014). It is even possible to modify the sensor 
measurement and trigger a faulty safety alarm (Shinohara & Namerikawa, 2017). The navigation 
computer systems can be infected using SQL injections (DNV GL, 2016; Flaus, 2019) and the ship 
navigation systems have been proved vulnerable to malware installations (Wingrove, 2018). 
 
GPS signal is a relatively weak signal and can be easily jammed (Borio, Driscoll, & Fortuny, 
2012; Boyes & Isbell, 2017; Farid, Ahmad, Ahmed, & Rahim, 2018), spoofed (Goward, 2017) or 
resent with delay (Omitola et al., 2018) . AIS information is transferred using VHF radio with no 
encryption allowing valuable information to be easily obtained (Maritime affairs directorate of France, 
2016) but it can be also altered or jammed (Balduzzi, Pasta, & Wilhoit, 2014). LiDAR sensors depend 
on reflection signal, so they can be spoofed if objects with relevant reflective/absorbent surfaces are 
set in front of them (Brooks, 2016). Cameras can be easily dazzled or spoofed as well (Alguliyev, 
Imamverdiyev, & Sukhostat, 2018; Brooks, 2016). The components connected to CAN networks are 
vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, as an artificial control node can be created in the 
network, shadowing other controllers, sensors and actuators (Bozdal, Samie, & Jennions, 2018; 
Kang, Song, Jeong, & Kim, 2018). This generates opportunities for attacks if a physical device can 
be attached to the ship CAN (CISA, 2019c). Modbus protocol is among the oldest protocols, which 
is not encrypted and a DoS attack can be easily implemented affecting in this way the availability of 
sensors/actuators (Flaus, 2019). 
 
More vulnerabilities can be found on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 
website (CISA, 2019a) and National Vulnerability Database (NIST, 2019). For the present analysis 
though, the above list of vulnerabilities can be considered as adequate. 
 
The CPHA scenarios with RI greater or equal with 9 (Steps 4-8 in Figure 1) are provided in 
Table 6. In total 48 scenarios have been identified, with 19 of them being critical, 24 in a tolerable 
region and only 5 of them have been initially characterised as negligible. After the incorporation of 
the available and new safety/cyber security/security barriers, no scenarios were considered as 
critical, 21 were considered as tolerable and the rest (27) as negligible. The most critical scenarios 
are related to the access to the ship control station and shore control station, whilst other top critical 
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ones were related either to the GPS signal related attacks or a malware installation on the collision 
avoidance system and the situation awareness system. In this analysis, single attacks scenarios 
have been considered. However, more complicated attacks can be implemented, if several single 
attack scenarios are combined. Their identification is a subject of detailed risk analysis and hence 
out of the scope of the present research. 
 
The suggested safety cyber security recommendations (step 9 Figure 1) include the following: 
 Increasing redundancy in communication between different network zones (Zone 1, 
Zone 2, Zone 3 and Zone 4). 
 Installation of firewalls between each zone (on the conduits). 
 Addition of a safety system verifying the safety of the automatic navigation control 
system actions. 
 Sanity checks and filter application for the GPS signals measurements, addition of anti-
interference antennas. 
 Encryption for the VHF signals. 
 Use of kernels on the critical controllers. 
 Two or three factors authentication for software updates and patching. 
 Installation of an intrusion detection system in each zone. 
 Selecting critical health sensor measurements and sending them to the shore control 
centre at specific intervals. 
 Implementing a safe system shutdown, in case of a critical systems loss. 
 Interconnecting the main engine with the generator using power take-in/take off 
systems. 
 Plan route verification by the shore control centre 
 
 
.
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Figure 3 Network logical modelling. 
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Table 6 The critical CPHA scenarios (initial risk greater or equal than 9). 
a/a System Attack Feared event Consequences FI SI RI=S+SI 
Safety/security 
barriers 
S2 SI2 R2=S2+SI2 
1 
Shore control 
centre 
Social engineering 
Stealing access 
data and 
gaining 
authority to 
perform 
modifications 
Malware 
installation on 
ship and loss of 
ship control 
5 4 9 
Isolation of shore 
control centre from the 
company business 
network / Closing USB 
ports / Advanced 
intrusion detection 
systems and Antivirus 
3 4 7 
8 
Ship control 
station 
Physical attack 
Terrorist in ship 
control station 
getting access 
to the ship 
control systems 
Terrorists 
gaining control 
over ship 
6 4 10 
Two or three factors 
authentication - 
Physical barrier to the 
control room (door, 
etc.) - Cameras for 
intrusion detection and 
alarm - Quick alarm to 
police – Alarm if 
cameras are lost 
2 4 6 
25 
Collision 
avoidance 
system 
Malware 
installation 
System trying 
to collide with 
ships or 
specific objects 
Collision/ 
contact/ 
grounding 
5 4 9 
Safety verification 
system installation / 
Two or three factors 
authentication for 
software modification / 
Firewall installation / 
Kernel technologies 
3 2 5 
27 
Situation 
awareness 
system 
Malware 
installation 
Erroneous 
picture 
compilation 
Collision/ 
contact/ 
grounding 
5 4 9 
Two or three factors 
authentication for 
software modification / 
Firewall installation / 
Kernel technologies / 
Intrusion detection 
system and Antivirus 
2 4 6 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
The shipping industry is entering new era with autonomous vessels being designed, built and 
operated. However, their introduction comes at the expense of an increased number of hazardous 
scenarios due to potential cyber-attacks. In this paper, an enhanced CPHA was employed with the 
support of the FSA risk matrix for identifying the safety related cyber-attacks, which can be 
implemented by terrorists, to the navigation and propulsion control systems of an autonomous inland 
ship. 
 
The main findings of this study are the following: 
 A number of technical vulnerabilities such as GPS signal vulnerabilities, PLCs integer 
overflow vulnerability and VHF lack of cryptography are available at the existing 
systems, which can be exploited during cyber-attacks. 
 Attacks on the shore control centre and the ship control station targeting at getting 
privileged access have the highest potential safety implications. 
 Malware installation on the collision avoidance system and the situation awareness 
system also have significant safety implications. 
 System safety can be improved by adding firewalls on the conduits between different 
control zones, increased redundancy in communication between control zones and 
installing intrusion detection systems. 
 
This analysis results can be used to enhance autonomous and other ships designs and guide 
more detailed risk assessments of the ship systems. The analysis could be extended by applying 
the CPHA for other attack groups or supporting CPHA results by multiple expert ranking. In addition, 
a more detailed cyber-security analyses employing more labour intensive methods could be 
implemented. All this constitute suggestions for future research. 
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APPENDIX A – ABBREVIATION LIST 
AIS Automatic Identification System 
CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
CPHA Cyber Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
DoS Denial of Service 
ECDIS Electronic Chart Display Information System 
FSA Formal Safety Assessment 
GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety System  
GPS Global Positioning System 
LADAR Laser Detection And Ranging 
LiDAR Light Detection And Ranging  
MaCRA  Maritime Cyber-Risk Assessment 
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
PSB Pallet Shuttle Barge 
RADAR RAdio Detection And Ranging 
SCADA System Control And Data Acquisition 
VDR Voyage Data Recorder 
VHF Very High Frequency 
 
